Defeat Oplan Bantay Laya 2 completely
The fascist reactionary army could not conceal the fact that the New People’s Army (NPA) remains widespread and strong and capable of dealing powerful blows on their forces. Thus, the fascist puppet AFP could not avoid admitting that Oplan Bantay Laya 2 (OBL2) has failed to meet its target of crippling the NPA and the revolutionary movement in time for the counterrevolutionary campaign’s deadline by the end of the US-Arroyo regime’s term in June 2010.
But it persists in trying to deal powerful blows or even a knockout punch before its deadline or even beyond it. To achieve this, the fascist enemy is currently implementing the following:
▪ The AFP has narrowed down its focus to the top priority guerrilla fronts. To be able to concentrate a bigger force on each target, the AFP has reduced the number of priority targets of each area command from the former 10-12 to only five to six guerrilla fronts (Nolcom — Kalinga, Abra, Aurora, Bataan, Zambales; Solcom — guerrilla fronts in Quezon, Sorsogon and Masbate; Cencom — guerrilla fronts in Negros and Samar; EastMinCom — guerrilla fronts in the Davao provinces).
Fronts that were formerly targeted have been relegated to second priority. The AFP has added combat forces to achieve a minimum of one battalion for every priority area to two battalions for every guerrilla front in focus. For this, it has, since 2009 formed seven new infantry battalions and two battalions of Scout Rangers and Special Forces. It has also recruited CAFGU forces that are no longer confined to camps but actively utilized to scour priority areas
▪ Due to the failure of the AFP’s strike forces, it is now strengthening its CMO units and operations in the hope that these would be effective in deceiving, spying on and terrorizing the people, weakening their revolutionary spirit and clearing the way for combat forces. It has set up one battalion for each division and deployed one CMO company to each cluster of priority guerrilla fronts.
The CMO focuses on intensifying psywar and black propaganda against the revolutionary movement in the target communities. A large part of the CMO’s activities involves recruitment for the Barangay Intelligence Network (BIN) and CAFGU and organizing surrenderees into chapters of CADRE (Confederation of Advocates for Development and Reforms). The CMO also arranges regular radio broacasts for quite a number of Philippine Army battalions.
Through the CMO and utilizing the BIN, CAFGU and CADRE, among others, the AFP strengthens its intelligence operations in order to determine the NPA’s movements. The objective is to ensure that military operations have definite targets and reduce resource-intensive operations that do not have definite targets. Intelligence activities are also being intensified against identified Party and NPA leaders on the provincial and regional levels; persons suspected of being active in, or supporting the, revolution in the target bases; and the revolutionary movement’s support network such as communication and supply lines, among others.
In partnership with other units, CMOs also play a big role in killing identified cadres, leaders, organizers, activists and sympathizers of the revolutionary movement and the legal democratic movement, harassing families of known cadres and members of the revolutionary movement, and similar dirty jobs. Also utilized for such activities are recruits of the BIN, CAFGU, CADRE and others. The AFP has likewise been coordinating more closely with local governments, agencies and nongovernment organizations (NGO) for support for their CMO, intelligence and combat operations.
▪ The “Area Clearing” model has been propagated nationwide. “Red Area Clearing” is implemented in guerrilla fronts in the countryside (as what was done in Central Luzon) and “White Area Clearing” is implemented in urban areas (as what was done in the Southern Tagalog Region). ”Red Area Clearing” (RAC) involves deploying one battalion to each target guerrilla zone. It is the brigades that take charge of and draft plans for RAC.
RAC likewise involves the use of the “keyhole approach” in the suspected guerrilla base to be targeted. The “keyhole approach” begins with the simultaneous and concentrated deployment of Special Operations Teams (SOT) to the guerrilla base area in the cluster of contiguous barrios and sitios. The SOT deployment is longterm and repeated multiple times, with patrols scouring areas within, around and between villages.
These operations are a combination of 60% combat, 30% intelligence and 10% CMO operations. The CMO operations will comprise a bigger part once it is believed that the NPA is no longer in the area and RAC shifts to the support stage. In implementing this combination, the enemy hopes that the revolutionary forces will not be able to easily recover guerrilla zones that have already been “cleansed” by RAC.
The AFP identifies amd prepares one or a number of “engagement areas” (areas where the enemy has deeply planted intelligence operatives and merely waits for opportunities to clash with the NPA) and “Venus flytraps” (nearby areas where the enemy has deeply planted intelligence operatives but where the AFP purposely refrains from conducting frequent operations so that retreating NPA forces who choose to flee to these areas can be encircled and besieged). The AFP also identifies one or a number of “constriction areas,” (areas where the enemy has a weak military presence and intelligence network and thus may become targeted by the NPA as expansion areas away from the AFP’s current area of focus. The AFP therefore tries to block the NPA from expanding to these areas).
It deploys troops to engage in battle NPA units that enter or pass through these areas in order to trap them or force them to flee to areas that have been designated as “Venus flytraps” where they can be encircled and forced to engage in a decisive battle. Alongside the conduct of RAC, the AFP also conducts “White Area Clearing” (WAC), where it prioritizes the destruction of regional white area machineries, the neutralization of identified cadres and organizers in various sectors, the conduct of counter-insurgency seminars and the formation of intelligence networks in various sectors as well as the setting up of organizations to serve as counterparts to open democratic organizations.
CMO operations are also being intensified in town centers within priority fronts and urban centers of regions where the targets are organized communities, persons suspected of operating in these communities, legal activists and allies and supporters.